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ABSTRACT
Taking into consideration that emergency state was lifted in southeast of Turkey in 
2002, but migration continued and negative net migration from Kurdish inhabited re-
gions still have grown. It can be argued that between 2002 and 2015 there was a more 
voluntary flow of internal migration. It was based more on economic and educational 
needs and pull factors than push factors connected with physical conflict, which was 
the case during the 1980s and especially the 1990s in Turkey.
With the failure of the peace process and drastic aftermath of coup attempt it can be 
argued that these changes will result in the wave of forced migration in the country. 
These processes can strengthen the atmosphere of insecurity in Turkey which will 
stimulate a wave of forced migration both in its internal and external aspects. The 
article aims at analyzing the events and their results which are connected with deteri-
oration of security in Turkey, and that can lead to the rise in forced migration. It starts 
with a general overview of circumstances leading to resolution of armed conflict. The 
second part of the article points to some estimations of deadly consequences of it and 
closes with an attempt to search for some indicators of the beginning of a new wave 
of forced migration in Turkey.
Voluntary – or relatively less insecurity-driven – spatial mobility appeared to be 
a significant part of overall Kurdish migration between the first and the second 
decade of the 21st century. This was a result of stabilization in Southern Kurdistan 
(Autonomous Kurdistan Region in Iraq) and democratic reforms in Turkey which 
culminated in a peace process (or more literally a solution process – çözüm süre-
ci) between the Turkish government and Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). I have 
previously advocated for recognizing and studying this new wave of migration 
1 The paper was written in the scope of project financed by Polish National Science Center by 
the decision number DEC-2013/09/N/HS3/02014.
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both in Turkey and among Kurds (see: Kaczorowski 2015; Kaczorowski 2016). 
Taking into consideration that emergency state was lifted in southeast of Turkey 
in 2002, but migration continued and negative net migration from Kurdish inhab-
ited regions still have grown. It can be argued that between 2002 and 2015 there 
was a more voluntary flow of internal migration. It was based more on economic 
and educational needs and pull factors than push factors connected with physical 
conflict, which was the case during the 1980’s and especially the 1990s in Turkey 
(see: Jongerden 2007). Migrants from that period did experience difficulties and 
conflicts connected with moving to a different place, but these hardships were of 
different nature than struggles of IDP’s who faced problems with legal recognition, 
registration and often lacked previously established networks of people coming 
from the same family or province (hemşehri) )(see: Çelik 2012). Consequently it 
can be argued that the period of 2002-2015 was stable in the political sphere which 
was more inclusive for Kurdish initiatives and open legal and social atmosphere 
allowed to intensify growth of Kurdish civil society initiatives.
Unfortunately with the failure of the peace process and return to armed con-
flict with PKK and devastating results of curfews in Southeastern Turkey it can 
be argued that this change in Turkish political landscape will result in the wave 
of forced migration, mostly consisting of people escaping from demolished dis-
tricts of Kurdish inhabited cities and from villages affected by military operations. 
Moreover the emergency state imposed in the whole country in the aftermath of 
the coup attempt will strengthen the atmosphere of insecurity in Turkey which 
will stimulate a wave of forced migration. This can be argued also on a theoretical 
basis as most Turkish and international scholars of migration point to military and 
physical conflict as a crucial factor influencing migration (see: Gezici and Keskin 
2005; Filiztekin and Gökhan 2008: 6-7; Sirkeci 2009).
The presented article aims at analyzing the events and their results which are 
connected with deterioration of security in Turkey, and that can lead to the rise 
in forced migration. It starts with a general overview of circumstances leading to 
resolution of armed conflict. The second part of the article points to some estima-
tions of deadly consequences of it and closes with an attempt to search for some 
indicators of the beginning of a new wave of forced migration in existing data on 
internal migration in Turkey.
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EVENTS LEADING TO IMPOSITION OF CURFEWS2
On June 7, 2015, marked the historical outcome of parliamentary elections in Tur-
key. Elected political representation included delegates of ethnic and religious mi-
norities – Roma, Armenian and first Yezidi deputy. For the first time in the history 
of Turkish Republic, the party sympathetic to the Kurdish minority and their prob-
lems (People’s Democratic Party – Turkish shortcut HDP) passed very high 10% 
threshold. Despite the fact that the partial reason of installment of such threshold, 
after 1984 military coup, was to prevent the Kurdish political movements’ involve-
ment. These elections were also special as due to their result, Recep Tayyip Er-
doğan’s Justice and Development Party (Turkish shortcut – AKP) for the first time 
in 13 years could not reign alone. The result seemed to show also Turkish public’s 
rejection of the presidential system intensively promoted by the ruling party and 
President Erdoğan. It was also the time when the peace process between Turkish 
state and Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) was in a kind of crisis because of differ-
ent stances towards Democratic Union Party (Kurdish shortcut PYD) fight with 
Islamic State in Northern Syria (Western Kurdistan). Clashes between guerrilla 
fighters in rural areas and Turkish army were, however, limited and there was a lot 
of hope for peace connected with ongoing talks between HDP and the government. 
Lots of Turkish figures also expected that legitimization of HDP in parliament will 
lead to completion of PKK’s withdrawal of arms which began in 2013.
Hopes created as the result of June elections were turned into dust in late July 
when the AKP’s government announced Turkey’s war on terror officially aimed 
against both IS and PKK, but with significant focus on bombing and arresting 
people affiliated with the second organization. Turkey has provided the United 
States the access for its Incirlik base, vital for conducting air attacks on IS targets, 
however, Turkish jets bombed mainly PKK bases in country’s southeast (Northern 
Kurdistan) and Northern Iraq (Southern Kurdistan – where in Qandil mountain are 
perceived headquarters of the organization). Many leftist activists were arrested 
2 The article includes enumerations of arrests, victims of violence, terror and persecution. This 
data is surely incomplete and I apologize for that. More than a detailed relation of events it serves 
as an illustration of deteriorating situation of security in Turkey which indicates new wave of 
forced internal migration and emigration.
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and first curfews were imposed in cities of the Southeast. Officially the reason for 
fighting PKK was the murder of two policemen by youth organization sympathetic 
to PKK – Patriotic Revolutionary Youth Movement (Turkish – Yurtsever Devrimci 
Gençlik Hareket YDG-H). The group – operating mainly in Kurdish cities and 
Kurdish inhabited districts of large Turkish metropolis – has before committed 
some extrajudicial killings of people allegedly connected with IS. Killing of the 
policemen was, in YDG-H’s view, a retaliation for Turkish services negligence (or 
perceived by many Kurds – complicity) in terrorist bombing in Suruç (near the 
border with Syrian Kurdistan) which left 31 leftist activists dead and more than 
hundred people wounded. According to YDG-H, the executed policemen were in 
some way connected to IS or organization of the bombing.
This deterioration of relations was preceded by bombing in HDP’s rally in Di-
yarbakir, and many government and presidential statements indicating that: „Ko-
bane will fall”, „Islamic State is less dangerous than PYD” and that it is a more 
tolerable neighbour than Syrian Kurdish organization with its ties to PKK. The 
war on terror announced by Turkey was aimed at improving Turkish international 
image in the time of pressure from international public for the country to engage 
more actively the fight with IS. Some allegations from voices both inside and out-
side of the country were raised about government’s negligence or even compliance 
with activities of IS. For the first time in its history Erdoğan’s moderately Islamic 
party embraced to such an extent a nationalistic agenda. Resurrecting armed con-
flict with leftist Kurds corresponded also to political strategy of gaining votes from 
far-right – necessary for a return to a single party rule. It can be noted, however, 
that along this strategy, all achievements of peace process were destroyed and ul-
tra-nationalistic discourse was raised to the main stream debate.
When AKP indeed benefitted from increasing support of nationalists and gained 
advantage in snap elections of November, relations with Kurds were not stabilized 
but more curfews were imposed and even more fierce measures were taken to fight 
resistance in Kurdish populated regions. After securing 317 places in the parlia-
ment from the total of 550 the ruling party can govern single-handedly but still 
does not have a majority allowing it to propose a referendum about presidential 
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system (this would be 330 seats) or impose it without (400 seats needed)3. Some 
like Diyarbakır based journalist – Fréderike Geerdink, hypothesized that continu-
ation of military conflict with leftist Kurds is aimed at earning more deputies by 
encouraging delegates of Nationalistic Movement Party (Turkish shortcut MHP) 
to enter AKP. Geerdink was herself arrested and deported from Turkey in Septem-
ber 2015 on the grounds of being a journalists who supports „terrorism”. Expected 
growth of seats can be achieved also by banning HDP which can eventually lead 
to attributing votes to party with second best result in Kurdish regions – AKP. 
Moreover, ongoing tactics against PKK were supported by army which perceives 
PYD success in northern Syria as a greatest threat for Turkey in the region. While 
attacking PKK affiliate – PYD directly in Syria might have drawn fierce criticism 
from the West, Turkish state tried to weaken the organization in Turkey and in 
Iraq. These military and political objectives seemed to overshadow – in the eyes of 
state – the costs of civilian repression, deaths and deterioration of living conditions 
in the Southeast. The situation reminding the one which occurred in the1990s – 
the darkest era of Turkish army were thousands of Kurdish villages were burnt or 
expelled.
DRASTIC CONSEQUENCES OF CURFEWS  
AND SECURITY OPERATIONS
According to the report of Human Rights foundation of Turkey (Türkiye İnsan 
Hakları Vakfı – TİHV), curfews affected 1377 000 people as they were imposed 
58 times in 7 cities and 19 districts. Between August 16 and January 8 there were 
162 civilian victims including 32 children, 29 women, and 24 elderly people (over 
60 years old). Almost half of this tragic toll (79 civilian deaths) was taken between 
December 11 and January 8. Victims included also people who were shot in their 
homes. It is impossible to distinguish which deaths might have been caused by 
YDG-H fighters and not Turkish forces as at the time there was no examination of 
civilian casualties, and there were cases where it was impossible to obtain the dead 
3 This situation can however change in extraordinaire atmosphere after the attempted army 
coup on July 15th 2016.
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and bury them, as military operations were continued. It is however known that 
bombing of Çınar police station in Diyarbakır left among others 5 civilians dead 
including 2 children.
Human Rights Watch published in December 2015 the report presenting col-
lected statements of people in the areas under curfews. The organization under-
lined the need for reduction in using un-adequate force from the side of Turkish 
army and thorough examination of civilian deaths. Amnesty International has also 
called authorities of countries to stop collective punishment of Southeast inhabit-
ants (HRW 2015).
The estimation calculated at the end of April 2016 by Human Rights Foundation 
of Turkey, pointed to 1,5 million people affected by curfews. Since announcement 
of first such state in August 15, until April 20, 2016, the Turkish operations and 
fights with YDG-H have led to 338 civilian deaths (including 30 elders, 69 women 
and 78 children). Moreover, 93 people who died during the curfews were not iden-
tified as they were buried immediately. Kurdish activists pointed to destruction of 
5,000 houses, while Turkish Ministry of Health have calculated that until March 
2016, 355 000 people were forcibly internally displaced (see: Rudaw 2016). The 
excessive use of force by Turkish authorities was assessed also in the reports pre-
pared by more conservative muslim organization – Mazlumder – The Association 
for Human Rights and Solidarity for the Oppressed (2016a, 2016b). The following 
map prepared by Ali Zifan illustrates places in which Turkish army operations 
were conducted.
Source: Ali Zifan [CC BY-SA 4.0 (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0)], via Wikimedia Commons 
https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/4/4e/Turkish-PKK_rebellion.svg
FRITILLARIA KURDICA. BULLETIN OF KURDISH STUDIES | NO. 13-14, 09.2016 109
Severe results of Turkish armed operations ending in destruction of whole 
neighborhoods in Kurdish inhabited cities – including the ones residing in the his-
torical Sur district of Diyarbakır (Kurdish: Amed or Diyarbekir) have caused calls 
from many commentators to recognize them as urbicide – deliberate destruction 
of social urban space of a targeted group. Matthieu Gosse – a French geographer, 
in an article published in La revue Urbanités, underlined not only physical but also 
symbolic indicators of such a process: Turkish nationalistic slogans on the walls of 
many buildings, covering the historical city walls with giant Turkish flag, closing 
and damaging the house of dengbêj (which aimed at preserving and reviving Kurd-
ish oral tradition), occupation of municipal museum by the army and deterioration 
of rich Christian heritage in the city (both by gunfire and racist inscriptions), which 
was often underlined by the HDP ruled municipality: Syriac church of the Virgin 
Mary, Chaldean Church in March Petyun and Armenian Catholic Church (Gosse 
2016).
The symbolic aspect of return to persecution of Kurdish movements in Turkey 
was also connected with police raids which started in late July 2015. Vast major-
ity of them were aimed at PKK and not IS. During the arrests, there were many 
Kurdish activists accused of collaboration with PKK. Moreover, the sole call for 
stopping the excessive use of force in operations in the Southeast proved to be 
persecuted by the authorities. Scholars from many universities across the Turkey 
and from abroad, who signed the petition called „Academics for peace” faced pub-
lic defamation and criminal charges. They were called „helpers of terrorist” and 
„traitors”, their names were also published in a pro-governmental newspaper with 
derogatory connotations. Most of signatories from Turkey faced charges, some 
were fired or forced to leave their university posts. Human Rights Watch estimated 
in March 2016 that three academics were jailed, 30 removed and 27 suspended 
as consequence of signing the petition (HRW 2016). Some journalists and human 
rights jurists were also arrested, among them the head of Human Rights Founda-
tion of Turkey and professor of Istanbul University – Şebnem Korur Fincancı. Fin-
cancı was released in July but charges against her were upheld, their consequences 
could result in the penalty of 14 years in prison (CCS 2016). After the attack of 
TAK in Ankara in March 2016, President Erdoğan has called for a legal change 
allowing inclusion of jounralists and academics in the pursuit of aiding „terrorism” 
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(see: HRW 2016). This can result in widespread arrests of people who in any way 
criticize Turkish policy and operations in the country’s southeast. It may result also 
in self-censorship and silencing dissent against the government, but most definite-
ly in rise of the atmosphere of constant threat of being legally persecuted.
EMERGENCE OF NEW KURDISH ARMED GROUPS
Fight against the police and army was led mainly by radical youth sympathizing 
with PKK who organized themselves as Patriotic Revolutionary Youth Movement 
(Yurtsever Devrimci Gençlik Hareket – YDG-H). The group was formed shortly 
before the peace process in 2013. In contrast to rural guerilla of PKK it operates 
mainly in Kurdish cities and Kurdish inhabited districts of large Turkish metrop-
olis. Officials of KCK – a military wing of PKK – have at several times declared 
that they do not have full control over YDG-H. PKK itself can be treated as a 
political party gathering a wide range of leftist sympathetic to the Kurdish cause, 
including those who taking example from its captured leader – Abdullah Öcallan’s 
urge for peace, does not see physical conflict as a way to gain Kurdish rights. Calls 
for peaceful resolution were raised especially by Peoples Democratic Party (HDP), 
and its leader Selahattin Demirtaş has spoken about uselessness of violence. On 
the other hand, radical youth tactics are not condemned as widely as are Turkish 
forces which are perceived by Kurds as a primary source of oppression and oc-
cupier. That was the reason behind the declaration of autonomy in many Kurdish 
regions under curfews.
In December 2015, new force, aiming at supporting YDG-H’s in a wider spec-
trum was proclaimed. Taking up the name of Civil Protection Units – (Kurdish – 
Yekîneyên Parastina Sivîl – YPS), which is a close reference to Syrian Kurdish 
People’s Protection Units (YPG) defending the autonomy of Rojava. During the 
declaration of YPS Botan in Cizre: Civil Protection Units were described as a result 
of exercising legitimate right of Kurdish people against the „physical, political and 
cultural genocide perpetrated by Turkish army”. It was also stated that the group 
takes the same stance as youth who organized YDG-H and was created in need of 
further enlarging their cause. YPS announced that they goal was also to demand 
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the Turkish state to pay for policy of assimilation, occupation and forced migration 
of Kurds. The announcement called to arms all the Youth of Botan districts (stating 
their names in Kurdish: Cizîr, Sîlopya, Hezex, Şirnex, Nisebîn, Kerboran), howev-
er, the authors underlined that they struggle was not a sole struggle for self-rule of 
Kurdish people, but a struggle for freedom of the whole Turkish public (people). 
Some assumed that it was just a change of name from YDG-H, but declaration of 
gathering wider support can show signs of more direct cooperation between PKK’s 
guerilla and radical urban youth, and an attempt to call for protection of declared 
autonomy. There were also some rumors that rural guerilla would come to cities 
and join the battle side by side with youth.
Such a general call to arms maybe a result of some leftist Kurds’ perception of 
being pressed to the limits by the state by its continuation of violent policy against 
Kurdish society. As many commentators point out, there are some factors that can 
be attributed to radicalization of a part of Kurdish Youth. Young people of YDG-H 
and YPS were usually raised in the 1990s in the atmosphere of a total war, their 
families could have been expelled from their native villages, fathers spent years in 
jail. They themselves, often with limited economic opportunities, might have lived 
in constantly instable conditions. Exemplary to the situation was a constant threat 
of being arrested just for sole participation in a peaceful protest for Kurdish rights. 
This atmosphere of insecurity might have rendered them radical, with a sense of 
no solution than violence which in effect might have caused in some of them the 
lack of respect for human life.
Another organization fighting against Turkish state but with more deadly and 
public consequences was Kurdistan Freedom Falcons (in Kurdish: Teyrêbazên 
Azadiya Kurdistan – TAK). Allegedly separated from PKK in 2004, the group 
since the following year executed some bombings (including the one on Taksim 
Square in Istanbul in 2010) which targeted not only Turkish army and police but 
also civilians. Their actions drew public attention and condemnation in 2016 as 
bombing of a bus with soldiers in Ankara in February brought 29 (including 16 ci-
vilian) deaths and the following attack in the city’s central district in March, killed 
37 people – mostly civilians. Although the group claimed their separation from 
PKK which was perceived by Falcons as using too „humanistic” approach, the 
public of Turkey widely recognized the terrorist attack in March as done by PKK. 
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Representatives of PKK’s headquarters have on several occasions denied involve-
ment in the attack and control over TAK – described as autonomous, hidden and 
allegedly not very known (in terms of personal involvement) to PKK group. Mem-
bers of parliament elected from HDP lists, including its leaders have also strong-
ly condemned these attacks. However, international and Turkish commentators 
(including publicists and scholars) pointed to ambiguous ties between TAK and 
PKK. It has been argued that given negative approach to other armed groups and 
organizations representing Kurds in earlier decades, PKK at least did not stop the 
TAK, and attacks accomplished by the organization would have been very difficult 
to prepare with no use of previous PKK guerilla experience and networks. Falcons 
did address Abdullah Öcallan as a leader of Kurdish people and claimed that their 
attack was a retaliation for 300 civilian casualties of the security operation in Cizre 
(see: Porter 2016; Geerdink 2016). Their ideology, however, still remains connect-
ed with Kurdish separate state which is contrary to the idea of Democratic Con-
federalism and Turkification which has been announced and promoted in recent 
years by Öcallan. Some pointed also to the atmosphere of radicalization of Kurdish 
youth in the wake of IS siege on Kobane and worsening of situation in Turkey’s 
southeast. In such condition it is probable that radicalized Kurdish youth would be 
difficult to control and not regard traditional PKK hierarchy or familial ties. They 
did, however, respect the ceasefire announced by PKK before the Turkey’s parlia-
mentary elections in November 2015.
It has been observed that violent actions of YDG-H and PKK can strongly neg-
atively influence both short-term and long-term goals of leftist Kurds in Turkey. 
Some way of negotiation with the state appears to be necessary in the future in 
order to achieve an autonomy or just secure peaceful political functioning (see 
Dalay 2016; Geerdink 2016). Returning to military measures was also negatively 
perceived by many from Turkish public opinion who called for the end of violent 
ways of dealing with Kurdish question in the aftermath of HDP’s passing the elec-
tion threshold in June 2015.The international and domestic image of PKK was 
arguably most negatively affected by terrorist attacks of TAK aiming at civilians. 
The organizations are often perceived as being somehow connected despite that 
their representatives did state otherwise. Most of the respondents of qualitative 
research conducted by Serhun Al (2016) in the areas affected by curfews did not 
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support violent methods used by YDG-H. The participants of the study pointed to 
deterioration of security of their livelihoods and relatives. However, Turkish army 
and police were still perceived as the primary aggressor because of the destruction 
of neighborhoods and excessive use of force. Measures used by the army were 
widely regarded as inadequate to relatively much worse equipped tactics of urban 
guerilla of young radicals.
OTHER FACTORS OF DETERIORATION OF SECURITY –  
THE AFTERMATH OF COUP ATTEMPT
Arrests and police raids intensified after the failed coup attempt organized by the 
group within the army (designated by the government as tied with Fetullah Güllen 
but likely having radical kemalist connections). The coup attempt resulted in at 
least 265 deaths. President Erdoğan has also suggested that following chants of his 
supporters on the streets, if the parliament agreed, death penalty could be reinstated 
in the country in order to punish the ones who stood behind the coup. In the after-
math, with the goal of purging the country from supporters of the coup 2839 army 
members were arrested and authorities ordered detainment of 2745 prosecutors 
and judges (Yuhas et al. 2016). Some of the judges and jurists have written letters 
to international law associations (including their colleagues from Poland) sharing 
their pain and feeling of insecurity waiting for being arrested. Among these letters 
underlined were claims of surprise in being enlisted on the warrant and perception 
of being persecuted just for legal criticism towards government (Gazeta.pl 2016).
 In the scope of the attempt to purge the country from coup supporters 15 000 
employees of public education in Turkey were suspended, government also called 
for resignation of 1577 deans of both state and private universities. Licenses of 
21000 employees in private education were revoked, 100 people working in in-
telligence were forced to leave, 2156 people from staff of various governmental 
offices were dismissed, 30 governors of provinces and 47 governors of districts 
were removed. Additionally 20 internet sites covering news were blocked (Eu-
ronews 2016). The Higher Education Board (Yükseköğretim Kurulu – YÖK) re-
quested all of academics on foreign delegations to come back for the examination 
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and proclaimed temporary ban on any foreign delegations of scholars (see: Yeung 
2016). The atmosphere in the wake of the coup affected also the press. The Turk-
ish edition of weekly comic satire Le Man, prepared a special issue on the coup 
attempt, however, it was forced by the police not to release it4. In the evening of 20 
July, President Erdoğan announced the imposition of the state of emergency in the 
country, expecting it to last for three months. The Turkish army following the coup 
continued its operations against PKK, as it was illustrated by the airstrike in which 
20 guerilla militants in Northern Iraq were killed (HDN 2016).
From the perspective of the government and its supporters the aftermath of the 
coup can be understood as careful and legitimate examination of civil servants’ 
backgrounds in order to prevent further coup attempts and punish those who pre-
pared the one organized on July 20, 2016. Regardless of normative evaluation 
of the events in the aftermath of the coup, dismissing thousands of employee’s 
of both public and private institutions connected with arresting of hundreds will 
definitely affect their families and people of immediate proximity. This will most 
probably result in the rise of atmosphere of insecurity (at least for the mentioned 
people), and it will contribute to overall strengthening of insecurity in Turkey and 
growing influence of push factors both within internal migration in the country and 
emigration from Turkey.
Even before the coup, Turkey was perceived as a country threatened by Islamic 
and radical leftist terrorism. This perception was strengthened by the IS attack on 
Atatürk airport at the end of June 2016, which left 36 people dead and 147 injured. 
The airport is the largest in the country and the place transferring not only trave-
lers to Turkish Riviera, but also several countries in Asia and Africa (see: Tuysuz 
and Almasy 2016) . Deterioration of the situation of security in regards to Turkish 
state’s policy was also noticed by international organizations, an illustrative for 
this fact can be a report by Statewatch – an organization monitoring liberties in Eu-
rope. Emanuela Roman, Theodore Baird, and Talia Radcliffe (2016) who prepared 
the report argued that Turkey could not be treated as a safe country in terms of 
4 Both front-pages of the issue made a reference to the coup and contemporary success of the 
Pokemon Go game suggesting that both sides of the coup were religious conservatives and that 
people with knives and bats on the streets were ready for lynching Alevi's and Syrian refugees 
(see: Bianet 2016).
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international conventions. They underlined that the state had severe problems with 
guarding rights connected with definitions of a safe country: no risk of persecution, 
no risk of physical harm and non-refoulement (which means protection from send-
ing migrants back to areas where they are threatened). This means that the country 
has problems with direct physical danger of being attacked by terrorists, excessive 
use of force by the army or police and also the legal framework does not support 
protecting personal security of its citizens.
Growing insecurity in Turkey affects also Western Europe, as the European Un-
ion by signing the deal with Turkish officials agreed to provide financial support, 
grant visa-free travel in immediate future and stimulate countries integration with 
the community in exchange for reducing migration flow. Problems with democ-
racy, rule of law and ongoing military operation in country’s Southeast were the 
reasons why many western commentators called the deal unethical. Especially that 
many representatives of the EU have been perceived by many (including Turkish 
public opinion) as reserved towards further integration with Turkey and in a way 
obstructing the process prior to the migrant crisis. The promise to stimulate inte-
gration was not made in 2011 when the country was proclaimed by many as a mod-
el of democracy for country’s affected by Arab Spring, but it happened in 2015 
when the political sphere was restrictive and arguably in the worst situation since 
2002. Turkey was meant to reduce migration to Europe significantly by providing 
aid to refugees. However the country can produce its own forced migrants abroad 
as a consequence of growing domestic insecurity.
SOME INDICATORS OF THE WAVE OF FORCED MIGRATION
Achieving accurate data on internal displacement and forced migration is a difficult 
task, especially when processes stimulating it – in this case military operations, cur-
fews and conflict with YDG-H and PKK – are still ongoing. Additionally in many cas-
es it can be almost impossible to distinguish economic migration from conflict-driv-
en, having in mind that Turkish Southeast was for years characterized by high levels 
of economic insecurity (see e.g.: Içduygu et all. 1999). As mentioned before Turkish 
ministry of health gave 350 000 as the number of displaced people due to the conflict 
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with PKK in January 2016. According to Russia Today, 300 000 people were forced 
to leave their homes due to the curfews until December 2015. Contemporarily the 
number of people can be much higher as the curfews and operations continued. Oth-
er factors like coup attempt and emergency state in its aftermath have strengthen the 
role of push factors for internal migration in the country. Looking at official statistics 
on internal migration in Turkey in 2015, it cannot be directly interpreted that forced 
migration dominated internal migration in that year. The biggest rise in out-migration 
was, however, experienced by the Southeastern Anatolian region (in the period of 20-
14-2015 comparing to 2013-2014 it has risen by 25 093 and negative net migration 
risen5 by 19 881) although the proportionally biggest rise was in Eastern Black Sea 
region (in the period of 2014-2015 negative net migration more than tripled compar-
ing to 2012-2013). The data can be seen in the attached table.
5 The net-migration decreased from – 50 649 to – 70 530, in order to better illustrate it I have 
used the words "the negative net-migration increased".
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Looking at the data from the perspective of division into 26 sub-regions (groups 
of provinces divided according with standard NUTS2 for Turkey), some sub-re-
gions affected by the conflict like Ağrı, Kars, Iğdır, Ardahan and Malatya, Elazığ, 
Bingöl and Tunceli did not experience rise in negative net-migration while some 
other did not significantly differ than in previous years (e.g. Van, Muş, Bitlis and 
Hakkari). The biggest rise of negative net-migration among Kurdish inhabited 
sub-regions concerned: Mardin, Batman, Şırnak, Siirt (from -18769 in 2014 to 
-32403 in 2015, the biggest change since 2012) and Şanlıurfa, Diyarbakır (from 
-24459 to -30346 also the biggest change since 2012). As stated before the biggest 
rise in the negative net-migration in the whole Turkey concerned the sub-region 
Source: TUİK 2016, modified table generated from Turkish Statistical Institute’s website
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of the Black Sea (Trabzon, Ordu, Giresun, Rize, Artvin, Gümüşhane) (see: TUİK 
2016). It has to be noted that the data based on Addressed Based Population Regis-
tration System depend on official registrations and calculations of municipalities, 
especially in the case of displaced people leaving their homes in hurry. There can 
be a large group of migrants and IDP’s not included in the official reports. The 
higher growth of out-migration in 2015 comparing to previous years can be, how-
ever, an indicator of a growing wave of migration from Kurdish inhabited prov-
inces. Rise in insecurity of Kurdish inhabited sub-regions can, however, strongly 
influence official data in the future when internal migrants will be registering in 
new locations as a result of leaving their homes due to feeling rising physical and 
economic threat.
CONCLUSION
Imposition of curfews in Kurdish inhabited regions and the military conflict be-
tween Turkish army and PKK, YDG-H and TAK since July 2015 have affected 
1.5 million people, resulted in destruction of whole districts of cities, death of 
hundreds of civilians and displacement of at least 350 000. Additionally it can be 
argued that massive layoffs and investigations in the aftermath of the coup attempt 
in July 2016 will strengthen the atmosphere of insecurity among Turkish citizens 
which can result in a new wave of forced migration in Turkey. 
Unaware to many in the West, there is an ongoing internal war in Southeastern 
Turkey, led by the state against radical young sympathizers of Kurdistan Workers 
Party – PKK. Because the state imposed emergency operations people are unable 
to lead their normal daily lives, and they are in danger of getting shot in a cross-
fire every day. In predominantly Kurdish inhabited cities’ districts, such as Diyar-
bakır’s historical Sur access to healthcare and external space is highly restricted. 
Waste is not removed, there are food shortages, electricity is often turned off and 
clean water is a scarce resource. People who have to leave their houses are rushing 
through the streets waving improvised sticks with a white piece of cloth in order to 
underline that they are civilians.
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One can hope that eventually circles oriented on peaceful achievement of Kurd-
ish rights will dominate and Turkish state will stop the excessive use of force. 
These hopes, however, contemporary are not very high as President Erdoğan an-
nounced complete breakdown of the talks with anyone connected to PKK. The 
emergency state imposed in the wake of the coup attempt in July 2016 can lead 
to further arrests among Kurdish activists, continuation of military operations and 
diminish chances of peace talks. At the same time most attempts at urging for 
limiting destructive military operations during curfews were treated by Turkish 
officials as „treachery” and helping the „terrorism”. This was particularly visible 
in the reaction to the academic petition raising awareness of casualties caused by 
the curfews. Many of signatories employed by Turkish universities faced criminal 
charges (often under infamous article 301 describing defamation of Turkish nation 
or state). Even more employees from the education sector faced investigations in 
the aftermath of the coup.
As growing international support in solidarity with Turkish academics rises, it 
can be noted that more people in Europe started to pay attention to events taking 
part in Turkey.
A possibility of return to a peaceful solution of the conflict is still present as 
indicated for example by continuous functioning of legal pro-Kurdish leftist HDP 
party. The events analyzed in the article which happened in Turkey in 2015 and 
2016, point to emergence of return of forced migration within the country.
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